RUSI Newsbrief, 3 Sep 2013 By Jonathan Eyal

British Prime Minister David Cameron claims that it really is ‘business as usual’ in London, despite his government’s stunning parliamentary defeat on a motion authorising British forces to take part in a US-led military strike against Syria. Mr Cameron, who interrupted his holiday to take care of the crisis, remains huddled in Middle East briefings together with his top security advisers. The Obama administration is likewise being polite. ‘The British were very strong in condemning the Syrian regime’s use of chemical weapons and that vote inside the parliament doesn’t change that’, US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel said immediately after the vote in London.

Yet none of this changes the undeniable fact that Mr Cameron suffered one of the vital devastating parliamentary defeats in Britain’s modern history; the last time a premier lost a ‘war and peace’ debate was in the course of the crisis over the conduct of the Crimean War, greater than 150 years ago. It’s a debacle many need to wish away, but which grievously harms Britain’s claim to stay a world military player and undercuts years of diplomatic achievements.

There is widespread agreement among political observers that the prime minister handled the crisis very badly. Mr Cameron spent many months attempting to persuade the united states to ‘get serious’ – as he put it – concerning the carnage in Syria. Bizarrely, however, he never thought it essential to explain this to his own electorate. So, when the united states finally decided to select military action, David Cameron needed to scramble to make the case for using force. It was too little and much too late: nearly all of MPs refused to be bounced into war at a week’s notice.

Mr Cameron also neglected warnings from his own Conservative backbench MPs; he never bothered to read their critical comments on ConservativeHome, the party’s influential website, and he never bothered to refer to MPs or perhaps his own parliamentary whips.

These MPs are not any longer the  same retired army brigadiers with handlebar moustaches and large country houses; this kind of traditional Conservative law-makers who rallied to the flag during the past at the principle of ‘my country, right or wrong’. The hot intake of MPs expects to be heard, and when their government doesn’t hear them, they rebel. The prime minister was not defeated by the Labour opposition: Ed Miliband, its leader, didn’t perform particularly well through the parliamentary debate, making rambling demands for what he called a ‘sequential roadmap’ in Syria, an idea which left most MPs mystified. Instead, the British premier was struck by something far worse: a mass defection from the ranks of his own coalition government: thirty Conservative and nine Liberal Democrat MPs voted against the resolution.

But Mr Cameron’s biggest failure was his refusal to realise just how much Britain’s controversial involvement within the 2003 Iraq War loomed over the Syria debate. He repeatedly reminded law-makers that the crises within the two countries, one decade apart, don’t seem to be comparable. Still, the parallels were too close for comfort. There’s a similar inexplicable rush to war, an analogous refusal to attend for a report from UN investigators, the identical claim that Western governments ‘know’ who the culprit is at the basis of intelligence which, for sure, can’t be fully revealed.

And, if this weren’t enough, there’s also the similar confusion concerning the legal mandate and purpose of the operation. Prime Minister Cameron instructed his attorney general’s chambers to return up with a fast legal justification and so they did. ‘If action within the Security Council is blocked, the united kingdom would still be permitted under international law to take exceptional measures if you want to alleviate the dimensions of the overpowering humanitarian catastrophe in Syria’, read the legal opinion of Dominic Grieve, the attorney general.

But how could this humanitarian catastrophe be stopped by simply firing a couple of missiles, because the US and Britain have proposed? And, if the target is humanitarian, why not opt for regime change in Syria? It took Jack Straw, foreign secretary through the Iraq War, to deliver the proper blow, by reminding law-makers of the perils of going to war on fuzzy logic: ‘I know’, said Mr Straw, ‘I have the scars’.

Britain’s absence makes no difference to america. And, it could be argued, this absence can also be more likely to be a one-off. Still, quite a number precedents were created, that are more likely to haunt Britain sooner or later.

In strictly legal terms, British prime ministers should not have the approval of Parliament to send troops into battle; the flexibility to wage war technically sits with the Queen (the Royal Prerogative) and is exercised on her behalf by the prime minister. But Mr Cameron was forced by public dissatisfaction to hunt parliamentary approval. Neither Cameron nor President Barack Obama – who also decided to invite Congress for backing – accept the argument that this has now changed the legal powers in their office; both claim that the present parliamentary votes were simple consultations in preference to formal requests for authority to wage war.

Still, in future years, it’s inconceivable that any future British leader could be in a position to commit forces for any foreign operation with out a clear international mandate or the specific backing of national law-makers. The times when a British prime minister and an American president could sit on a bench within the park of the Camp David retreat and plan a war are consigned to history. That, some would argue, isn’t any bad thing. However the days when government and opposition inside the UK could reach decisions on security issues by consensus also are over. Paradoxically – and with the advantage of hindsight – Downing Street would were well-advised to simply accept a compromise solution, which might have involved Parliament in decision-making on war powers, but would have essentially maintained the initiative with the prime minister. This was suggested by various constitutional committees which checked out the question of war powers within the UK, and would have allowed future British prime ministers more leeway than they’ll now enjoy. In effect, Mr Cameron has created a parliamentary precedent at the hoof: governments will henceforth be expected to debate any military action in public, upfront.

And, because the debate in the home of Commons indicates, we should always not expect this type of discussion to be very elevated in quality. Nor should we predict it to display much strategic vision: quite other than the MPs who circulated harebrained conspiracy theories, the main telling phrase from debaters on Syria was: ‘our job on this parliament is to seem after our own people’. Presumably, therefore, it’s as much as somebody else to peer after global security.

If this perspective persists, it may destroy the UK’s longstanding claim, in conjunction with France, to be one in all Europe’s only global military powers. It also calls into question Britain’s usefulness to the united states. Essentially the mostsome of the most striking features of the talk about Syria was the degree of hostility toward the Americans shown by Britain’s legislators. A history of intimate links with the usa is now considered a poisonous legacy, and the reason is, Britain – always derided as America’s poodle – was precluded by Parliament from participating inside the Syria operation, while France, which has often stood aloof from america, can now act as its closest ally.

Nor should one forget the baleful effects the vote has on Britain’s standing inside the Arab world. The only cause of the Gulf States’ interest in buying British-made military equipment is the concept that they’re buying right into a long-term and meaningful security partnership. Now, however, they’ll come to view any such partnership differently, given the likelihood that, if the Gulf is in trouble and Britain’s government considers the location important enough to require the engagement of its militia, all that a British premier may do is to invite Parliament to discuss a resolution that can or would possibly not provide for some military assistance. Unsurprisingly, this isn’t one of these tempting proposition: French and American-made military equipment is barely pretty much as good, and possibly comes with more tempting financial inducements and the promise of a more meaningful security partnership.

It is feasible that Syria was the exception in place of the rule of thumb. Still, there’s little question that the episode was a disaster for Mr Cameron. The prime minister would have done well to keep in mind the words of a fresh-faced young MP who rose inside the British Parliament seven years ago to induce the country’s politicians to exercise ‘humility and patience’ before strutting at the international stage.

The name of that young MP was none as opposed to David Cameron.

Dr Jonathan Eyal
Director of International Security Studies, RUSI, and Editor of RUSI Newsbrief.
Twitter: @JEyal_RUSI

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