RUSI Analysis, 23 Jul 2013 By Hugh Chalmers, Research Analyst, Nuclear Analysis

The security risks posed by another ‘non-continuous’ nuclear posture, as outlined in last week’s Trident Alternatives Review, are inherently subjective. Financial (as opposed to strategic) arguments may come to dominate the choices debate – something the Liberal Democrats should have in mind.

Last Tuesday, the Coalition government announced the result of its review into alternatives to a like-for-like replacement of the UK’s ‘Trident’ nuclear system – a force of 4 nuclear-armed submarines maintaining a continual patrol. This method is because of get replaced within the mid-2020s, with an expected price ticket of between £17-23 billion (FY2013 prices), and an overall lifetime cost which can approach £97 billion.[1]

Bearing this cost in mind, the review explores quite a few alternative mechanisms and strategies for operating a nuclear force which can provide a reputable deterrent threat to potential aggressors. Overall, the review concludes that there are options to the present system that may inflict such damage, ensuring that ‘most potential adversaries around the globe can be deterred’.

For the Liberal Democrat party, that is certainly a welcome conclusion. The party rejected a ‘like-for-like’ replacement to the Trident system of their manifesto for the 2010 election, and in a speech at RUSI last Tuesday, Danny Alexander – Liberal Democrat ‘overseer’ of the review – used the occasion of the review’s launch to set up the principles of the Liberal Democrat argument for an alternate strategy to the UK’s nuclear future.

Mr Alexander acknowledged that moving far from a system of nuclear submarines armed with ballistic missiles isn’t cost-effective today, and suggested that the united kingdom should instead seek to finish permanent continuous submarine patrols, allowing the procurement of fewer replacement submarines. Of their place, the Liberal Democrats point towards four complementary postures outlined inside the review that may vary the frequency and duration of patrols (from near-continuous to no regular patrols), and the benefit where the united kingdom can move from one to a different as necessary, dependent on perceptions of the threats facing the united kingdom on the time.

Whether the united kingdom adopts this versatile way to non-continuous patrolling will ultimately depend on a parliamentary vote in 2016, when a last ‘main gate’ decision at the way forward for the UK’s nuclear force should be made. The review alone cannot make this decision. As a study commissioned by two parties with ‘very different approaches’ to this issue, it avoids making any overt cost-benefit calculations about each alternative, and opens by declaring that it’s not a press release of presidency policy. Rather, it leaves to ‘political confidence’ whether the united kingdom should operate a non-continuous nuclear posture.

Non-Continuous Nuclear Postures

Central to questions of ‘political confidence’ in a non-continuous posture is the truth that, by definition, any such policy would expose the united kingdom to periods by which its nuclear forces are inactive – susceptible to a possible pre-emptive strike and incapable of responding.

The duration and frequency of those periods of vulnerable inactivity vary between the four postures outlined within the review. A ‘focussed’ deterrent would maintain a continuing patrol for a selected amount of time in an atmosphere of heightened tension or conflict, with periods of inactivity defined only by necessary recuperation. Within the absence of such an atmosphere, the UK’s nuclear forces could move to a lower level of readiness akin to a ‘sustained’ deterrent (which might always have one submarine ‘on duty’ either patrolling or preparing to patrol), or a ‘responsive’ deterrent (by which submarines would only patrol in sporadic, irregular periods).  In a purely benign environment, the force could even adopt a ‘preserved’ posture wherein submarines only deploy to hold out non-nuclear tasks and to retain the power to maneuver to at least one of the more alert postures outlined above.

The Risks

The ‘political confidence’ a celebration has in this sort of flexible technique to nuclear posture depends on a fundamental assessment of the threats the united kingdom might face sooner or later.

The Trident Alternatives Review assumes that while the united kingdom faces no heightened tension or active conflict, inactive nuclear submarines are highly unlikely to be the objective of a no-notice surprise attack. While the reviews admits that this won’t be the case during a period of hostility, there’ll be a period of escalation to hostilities wherein the united kingdom might be ready to reduce the vulnerability of its nuclear forces by moving them from a lower-level posture (resembling a ‘sustained’ or ‘responsive’ deterrent) to a stronger-level posture (comparable to a ‘focussed’ deterrent). With this in mind, confidence during this non-continuous approach rests at the following questions.

First, once the united kingdom has moved its forces to a high-readiness ‘focussed’ level, can it keep them there throughout the duration of a crisis with a small fleet of submarines? A solution to this query relies on speculation concerning the nature and length of potential future crises, and the reliability of replacement submarines – something that can not be known at the moment, or (within the latter case) estimated without access to classified information. While the review states that a 3-boat fleet ‘would risk multiple unplanned breaks in continuous covert patrolling’, it cannot clarify how frequent or protracted such breaks may be: the design of the successor submarine has not yet been finalised.

A second question follows on from this: could a break in continuous covert patrolling during a period of crisis prompt a pre-emptive strike against inactive forces? Here the term covert patrolling is essential. The UK’s nuclear force currently needs several days notice to fireplace, suggesting that it already experiences periods wherein it cannot fire. However, these periods don’t reveal the presence of a submarine, making it prone to attack. If this covert presence is suddenly and unexpectedly made overt in a crisis, a submarine may become a horny (and potentially irresistible) target of opportunity to a possible foe.

However, a temporary break in covert patrolling won’t present a foe with much of a target. Submarines patrol in vast areas, and an exposed submarine could be very hard find, or even harder to credibly strike before any unexpected faults are remedied and the submarine returns to covert patrolling. Furthermore, the hazards of an exposed submarine becoming the victim to an opportunistic strike should be tempered by the specter of a retaliatory strike by forces allied to the united kingdom. So long as the united kingdom remains allied to america, such retaliation will always weigh within the minds of a possible aggressor. While you will need to question whether the united kingdom can rely upon the specter of such retaliation to discourage an attack, additionally it is important to bear in mind that twenty-five states within NATO (besides Japan and South Korea) are happy to take action.

Nevertheless, in a period of crisis, the chance of a pre-emptive attack on inactive UK forces can’t be ruled out entirely, and the threat (or realisation) of an unexpected and unavoidable interruption to patrolling in a crisis might pressure UK decision-makers into positions or reactions they won’t normally adopt.

A third question pertains to the nature of the threats the united kingdom might face. If a threatening adversary were to emerge, how would it not react to the flexibleness inherent inside the technique to non-continuous patrolling outlined within the review? Because the review states, while a rise in patrolling might cause an adversary to back off in a crisis, it can also pressure an adversary into increasing its threats – therefore escalating (other than de-escalating) a crisis. Furthermore, the specter of such inadvertent escalation might discourage the united kingdom from bringing its forces as much as a ‘focussed’ period of constant patrolling, therefore potentially encouraging an adversary further. With no clear picture of ways a future adversary would interpret a metamorphosis in posture, this query is again open to speculation.

While prominent approaches to diplomacy suggest that an adversary would judge the UK’s intentions totally on changes to its military capabilities, a up to date study of past crises means that an adversary is prone to judge intention not on military capabilities, but on a subjective interpretation of plenty of signals, including personal relationships and ideologies.[2] a transformation within the UK’s nuclear posture may therefore not be the decisive think about the escalation or de-escalation of a crisis.

The Rewards

There are not any entirely objective answers to those questions, and the arrogance held in a non-continuous deterrent may ultimately depend more upon gut feeling than speculations about future threats. Hence, the balance between the hazards of a non-continuous posture and the financial rewards offered by a smaller fleet of submarines may play a significant role in determining the way forward for the UK’s nuclear forces as much as 2016 and beyond. The Conservative party has already drawn upon this to argue that abandoning permanent patrols will be a ‘huge gamble’ for a ‘tiny saving’.

The review provides a large amount of information that permits readers to make their very own assessment as to if the savings are significant. It estimates that a three boat option would save £4 billion in procurement and support costs over the period 2016-2060 compared to a 4 boat option, when measured at constant 2012 prices. These savings would fall almost entirely in the course of the decade from 2025 to 2035, when savings can be around £350-400 million a year. Assuming that equipment spending continues to grow at 1% in real terms, this saving could be akin to around 5-6% of the projected equipment procurement budget within the late 2020’s.

For project evaluation purposes, a further annual discount on spending of three.5% per year is generally applied, to mirror the preference for spending one day rather then now. Using this ‘Net Present Value’ approach, the complete saving from a three boat option falls to just £1.7 billion. This can be the figure it is in most cases cited by Defence Secretary Philip Hammond. The Liberal Democrats, against this, wish to use the £4 billion figure, that is more relevant for comparisons around the defence budget. Both figures are right.

Both estimates seem to assume that few savings can also be made out of adopting the three boat option before 2025, for instance from retiring a number of of the leading edge boats previous to expected, or from postponing the beginning of labor at the first new submarine. If such savings were possible, total savings can be higher than estimated inside the Report.[3]

[1] Louise Edge, Inside the Firing Line: An Investigation into the Hidden Cost of the SuperCarrier Project and Replacing Trident, Greenpeace, September 2009

[2] Keren Yarhi-Milo, ‘In the attention of the Beholder: How Leaders and Intelligence Communities Assess the Intentions of Adversaries’, International Security, Vol.38, No.1 (MIT:Harvard) pp.7-51

[3] i’m grateful to my colleague Professor Malcolm Chalmers for help on this analysis of the budgetary aspects of the Review.

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