RUSI Newsbrief, 24 Jun 2013 By Scott Cline

Defence engagement, a catch-all term for non-operational military activity by which to succeed in influence internationally, is gaining momentum as a core military task for both the U.S. and the united kingdom. The explanation for this is often the will, in an age of fiscal constraint, to derive greater utility from the military: now not can a force simply drill in barracks while awaiting the following conflict. Furthermore, the largest lesson learned in Iraq and Afghanistan is that victory can’t be achieved through brute force alone, with defence engagement increasingly viewed as a prerequisite for understanding all aspects of a conflict. Indeed, by working proactively to deal with the roots of conflict, it’s hoped that this process can obviate the will for costly land campaigns.

To achieve such outcomes, numerous goals for defence engagement has been identified. These include demonstrating commitment to a partner country, establishing enduring relationships with military and political leaders, improving the host country’s ability to address its own internal security, increasing its willingness to take part in friendly coalitions, enhancing mutual understanding, reducing the opportunity of strategic surprise and the likelihood that aggressors miscalculate participating countries’ capabilities, and lengthening responsiveness to crises.

With limited experience to attract upon, whether these goals will be reached is still seen, and could mostly depend upon the extent of investment within the se processes. To this end, in the current fiscal context, the usa and British armies are exploring new ways of executing defence engagement, specifically by using dedicated military units and personnel, and by better aligning military outputs with strategic interests.

To satisfy the increased policy demand for defence engagement, america Army, for instance, has refreshed its Building Partner Capacity doctrine and established Regionally Aligned Forces as section of its force-generation model to support the US’s six Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) – the Africa, Central, European, Southern, Pacific and northerly Commands. Africa Command is the primary GCC to receive a dedicated army brigade, which it can direct in support of its Theater Security Cooperation Plan. Some 140 training events in thirty-four African countries are scheduled in 2013. Future force alignment will involve the alignment of brigades to Europe and the Pacific, of division headquarters to Latin America, North America, Europe and Africa, and of corps headquarters to the Pacific and Middle East. Anticipated activity in 2014 could exceed 5,640 discrete events in 162 countries.

Such engagement is simply not new to america Army. The National Guard’s State Partnership Program (SPP), for instance, has partnered all fifty US states with sixty-five countries in Europe, Africa, Asia and South America to conduct training over the process its twenty-two-year history. Though applauded by the GCCs, the SPP has not been without its problems. A 2012 congressional audit found systemic issues of goals and progress measures. Furthermore, the alignment of activity to strategic objectives needs refreshing: of the $7.1 million spent by the GCCs on SPP activity in 2011, $4.46 million was dedicated to Europe while only $225,000 (3 per cent) was directed to Africa.

In addition, america has no plans to habitually align brigades with specific regions, a measure which might contribute greatly to building relationships and extending understanding. The British Army, then again, is examining this sort of possibility.

Indeed, having laid out its International Defence Engagement Strategy alongside the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review, in 2013-14 the British Army will conduct a pilot project involving the regional alignment of 1 of its existing brigades, the result of that may determine the way other brigades are utilized in the longer term. Such alignments should not as expansive as those of the united states: brigades can be assigned to particular African regions rather than the whole continent, for instance, potentially making an allowance for more targeted activity.

Yet decisions must still be made as to how long personnel should remain with these units to be able to build enduring relationships. And likewise, there’s the difficulty that these brigades will retain responsibility for standing commitments (for instance, in Cyprus), UK resilience and rotations on longstanding operations, potentially diluting their talk about defence engagement.

Furthermore, while Regionally Aligned Forces may allow the u. s. and UK to accomplish probably the most key goals of defence engagement – including building partner capacity, showing commitment to host states and lengthening responsiveness to crises – they’re unlikely to contribute to all of them. It’s because non-persistent activity, despite the fact that conducted regularly, will at best only achieve familiarisation with the objective regions; building lasting relationships would require greater depth.

Here the British Army has essentially the most ground to hide, with america Army making the most of its Foreign Area Officer (FAO) programme. FAOs are selected after eight to 10 years in service (following company command) after which follow the career stream with specific education and management on the topic of their region (for instance, as embassy attachés, in military equipment sales, as regional desk officers, or as provincial reconstruction team leaders) for the rest of their career. Indeed, in 2005, america Department of Defense (DoD), by now aware of the detrimental effect of the shortage of cultural and regional awareness in Iraq and Afghanistan, directed all services to extend FAO numbers and commenced monitoring the effectiveness of the programme in supporting strategic objectives. Since then, the army’s programme has grown from 1,414 to two,046 officers – a forty five per cent increase – with further growth expected, especially within the GCCs. A key to the programme’s success is the delineation of FAOs and other non-command track jobs within separate career streams, with occupants of those positions boarded separately for promotions with DoD guidance that selection rates must be equal to these for command track officers.

Though the British Army offers quite a number FAO-like positions (including the jobs of defence attaché and regional desk officer), recruitment is just not based upon a holistic view of the necessity for specialized officer development over the long run. Indeed, attaché positions are generally filled by those not selected for higher command posts; this must change. In recognition of this, UK planners are exploring new career structures which may offer similar benefits to the united states model. But for the British Army to draw its best officers into this programme, it must provide specialised training and guarantee promotion at comparable rates to basic arms officers.

Beyond this, the likely success of defence engagement is associated with several key enablers. The primary, and predominant, is that its outputs are associated with strategic interests. Indeed, with funding remaining scarce, it’s essential that both the U.S. and UK ruthlessly justify their engagement in certain activities, eliminating that that is now not relevant and expanding that that is most pertinent. Closely tied to it is the will for activities to manifest within an entire-of-government effort. For instance, if the UK’s long-term goal is to contribute to regional security, military training may be but one portion of the method, with targeted DfID aid, Foreign Office engagement with regional security fora, and Stabilisation Unit efforts to extend ministerial capacity likely also required.

Finally, though upstream conflict prevention is more cost effective than protracted combat operations, it’s still not free. Current UK plans acknowledge this, but state that any budget increases for engagement will come from existing MoD funds, thus potentially coming on the cost of contingent capability. A modest increase of £25 million over the following four years have been allocated to UK defence engagement, but is that this enough? Although defence engagement and war-fighting are complementary, they don’t seem to be fungible, with the chance cost of each dollar or pound spent on overseas flights to undertake training being one less round of ammunition at the training range. And because it’s British and American combat capability that makes other nations like to partner with them, trading this for increased defence engagement defeats the point. Clausewitz’s view that ‘the end for which a soldier is recruited, clothed, armed, and trained … is barely that he should fight on the right place and the fitting time’ remains valid, and the united kingdom especially must proceed cautiously given its already low numbers of dedicated combat troops.

As defence engagement matures, the united states and UK (in addition to the ecu) will inevitably find themselves working within the same places. Occasionally this could be unavoidable, because the goal of such engagement could be to acquire concessions from the partner nation, comparable to overflight rights. At other times, however, when the target is solely that of enhancing the partner’s security capacity, training must be rationalised to stop unnecessary duplication, with participating nations dividing their labour in step with comparative advantage and even melding their training teams together.

Although bilateral deconfliction between the united kingdom and US may well be sufficient within the short term, the possible long-term benefits of using NATO as a defence-engagement clearing house also needs to be explored. First, this might allow the united kingdom to exercise leadership within NATO – a stated policy goal. Second, it’s going to keep NATO countries working together post Afghanistan: the NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan has evolved into a good example of firm capacity building and it’d be wasteful to lose this capability. Third, it will probably increase the forces available to undertake defence engagement: with such activity inherently built around small training teams, this may allow nearly every NATO country to take part, despite ever-decreasing force sizes. And eventually, it might optimise the sharing of information across NATO, as a precursor to future operations. NATO remains the popular alliance for the united kingdom and america and the notice gained by all members from defence engagement would only strengthen the Alliance’s utility.

Such optimism, however, has to be moderated and defence engagement ought not be viewed as risk-free. Domestic and regional balances of power are frequently highly unstable and any inputs into such dynamic systems could have unforeseen consequences. The upward push of Japan as an army power between 1859 and the second one World War was an instantaneous results of the learning and kit provided by the united kingdom and France. The alumni folks and British training programmes include such notables as Idi Amin (the despotic former president of Uganda), Amadou Sanogo (leader of the coup in Mali in 2012), and Manuel Noriega (the regional drug lord and previous military governor of Panama, deposed by US troops in 1989). Meanwhile, the upward push of the Taliban is directly associated with the arming of the mujahedeen to accomplish the near-term goal of defeating the Soviet Union in its 1979-89 war in Afghanistan. The history of defence engagement is replete with examples of the so-called ‘law of unintended consequences’.

Such experiences speak to the vital must treat defence engagement not as a brief-fix solution, but as an extended-term process requiring persistence and regularity. Within these parameters, a properly funded and structured army contribution to defence engagement can play a crucial role in shaping and understanding the international environment. The secret’s to prevent pushing the method too far and treating defence engagement as a panacea. While it can help to avoid crises, it’s far, unavoidably, a complementary approach that won’t preclude the necessity to react to contingencies or perform enduring operations when required.
 
Lieutenant Colonel Scott Cline
US Army Strategist (FA59), Exchange Officer to British Army General Staff.

The views expressed listed here are the author’s own and don’t necessarily reflect those of the Ministry of Defence, the dept of Defense or the other institution with which the writer is associated.

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