RUSI Newsbrief, 24 Jun 2013 By Sam Evans

The 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) sees the British Army delivering a scale, range and duration of military tasks which can not be performed by a discounted regular component alone. In delivering these requirements from a future force of 82,000 regular and 30,000 trained reserve personnel and to be prepared for the challenges of an unpredictable future, the military has needed to adopt a fundamentally new strategy to the way it is structured to satisfy its tasks.

From first principles, the military 2020 project designed a totally integrated force in a position to fulfilling three main roles: contingent capability (for deterrence and defence); UK engagement and homeland resilience; and overseas engagement and capacity building. Most importantly, it concluded that the reserve could not be organised solely to supplement the regular force for giant-scale intervention. This represents a serious shift from the present configuration of the Territorial Army to a model where elements would typically undertake delivery of military outputs, in appropriate roles and readiness, generated and maintained by force elements, including:

• Capabilities not requiring significant or complex collective training to keep readiness, comparable to sustainment roles in fuel support, transportation and the already well-established provision of medical services
• Specialist capabilities which it’s not possible, necessary or cost-effective to preserve completely within the regular force structure (as an example, medical, cyber, intelligence and language specialisations)
• Capabilities for longer-term institutional resilience, providing an important ability to regenerate a bigger army in times of need.

The British Army of 2020 will therefore have a better structural reliance on its reserves; they’ll become an indispensable component to the land force. This represents a fundamental shift within the purpose of the Territorial Army, which, to raised reflect this crucial change in role, is proposed to be renamed the military Reserve.

Recent operations have seen the military deploy some 23,000 reservists primarily as individual augmentees, specialist reserve capabilities (consisting of medics) and, from time to time, sub-units. One day there’ll be a demand to carry formed platoons, squadrons and now and again regiments from the Territorial Army at appropriate readiness, in order that the military can meet the tasks set within the SDSR. To deliver the military 2020 proposition, therefore, the assured availability of those capabilities, sufficiently trained and at a suitable level of readiness, is essential. That’s significantly more demanding than training individuals, particularly when a reservist’s time for training is restricted.

The requirement to routinely generate this level of collective capability represents a huge re-orientation for the Territorial Army and for the military as an entire; delivering the integrated army could be demanding.

The integrated force would be necessary to future success on operations at home and overseas. Delivering this force shall be depending on setting both the physical and conceptual conditions from the outset.

For the military to exist, it must train. This is applicable equally to the reserves, which may only deliver its contribution to the integrated force on a long-lasting basis whether it is trained, equipped and ready similarly to its regular counterpart.

Sustaining this contribution would require the Territorial Army to be routinely given tasks and operational deployments that experience genuine merit, relevance and appeal. Many will see reservists forming an integral section of a typical unit; equally, for less complex tasks, a reserve battalion could form the root of the deployed unit, with its regular partner providing augmentation. Such opportunities can play to a few of the innate strengths of the reserves, comparable to homeland resilience, overseas engagement and capacity building. There’s a natural tension with the standing forces; efficient and effective solutions might want to strike a balance that ensures prospects, professionalisation and opportunity around the force.

Underpinned by the army’s core values, future terms and stipulations of service will make sure the recruitment and retention of high-quality personnel – in line with a suitable balance between liability for and commitment to service – for a reserve that could expect greater routine use. The variety of tasks for which reservists may be mobilised might be better aligned with those in their regular counterparts. The chance of an entire career – balancing a field-focused force with broader prospects of employment around the integrated force – requires a more structured career-management model better exploiting the civilian knowledge, skills and experience of the reservist for the military. A comprehensive individual training and accredited education system might want to develop more appropriate knowledge, both to a reservist’s specific role and for wider employability. Additionally, the army education system for regulars must better understand the reserves as an integral part of the integrated force.

The Army 2020 future training model may even must accommodate the requirement to coach a single force with the time a reservist has, and is resourced, to coach.

Physical integration between reserve and regular units on a largely geographical basis, for training and for deployment on operations as a single force, is a necessary design principle and outcome of Army 2020. Formalised pairing between a customary and a reserve unit often is the important first step that sets the conditions to deliver integrated capability. It’ll facilitate coherent programmes of activity, deliver more efficient and effective training, and make sure better use of finite equipment, infrastructure and administration. It’s going to forge better links to local communities, to employers of reservists and to these leaving the regulars. Establishing the pairing arrangements, together with clarity of roles and locations, provides the conditions for the proper people to be recruited into the precise posts within the right portion of the rustic.

Pairing, and the revitalisation of the reserves, also offers an important opportunity to have interaction differently with the society from which the army recruits and to which it must consistently demonstrate relevance, utility and price.

The army is already conducting a sequence of pilot schemes to check the pairing and integration concepts. These studies may also help to raised define the army’s doctrine for the integrated force.

While noting the importance of a few of the changes required to generate this integrated force, two have to be viewed as fundamental to the successful integration of the reserves into Army 2020.

If the military is to genuinely operate within the fully integrated way envisaged by Army 2020, a cultural shift is needed by all parties – not just around the army, but around the defence establishment and more widely across society. This requires the interests of one or more key parties to be addressed and collectively managed and led. This has to be refrained from placing undue burdens on personnel – prejudicing the army’s outputs for defence and the nation, while continuing to retain the best reputation of the British Army. This would not be easy to reach. There’s the true risk that the myriad of change facing the military over the following couple of years – the top of combat operations in Afghanistan; redundancies of regulars; unit deletions and mergers; withdrawal from Germany; and basing changes – will disenchant and disenfranchise the very people required to deliver it.

The premium for increased reliance at the reserves is that their service ought to be enabled and enduringly supported in a method not previously done, including the availability of support to reservists’ families and employers. Society at large need to be given the means to higher understand, recognise and support this. While the reserves might be small as a proportion of the national workforce, employers must see greater equity of their relationship with the military. Currently, many employers don’t view the proposition as being balanced from their perspective. Benefits, inclusive of accredited skills and bigger predictability of educating and deployments, will go much of ways to re-balancing their view of the British Army’s taking advantage of very tangible and value-effective manpower gains.

The potential reward for achievement is awfully significant. Everyone within the army and wider defence establishment, whether regular or reserve, has a responsibility to make the fully integrated British Army a reality.

Brigadier Sam Evans
Assistant Chief of Staff Reserves, Army Headquarters.

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RUSI Analysis, 1 Oct 2013 By Shashank Joshi, Research Fellow

With the primary signs of a US-Iran thaw, there are great hopes – and great cynicism. Yet while the optimists might be overstating the scope of any deal, the cynics are wrong to dismiss Hasan Rouhani’s rhetoric.

In the top, there has been no handshake – but there has been a phone call. Iranian President Hasan Rouhani first rebuffed the White House’s offer of a historic meeting with President Barack Obama but, previous to departing the us, initiated a telephone conversation that was thin on substance but rich in symbolism. That decision, in addition to Rouhani’s relentlessly conciliatory tone, has prompted euphoria amongst some, who foresee a geopolitical re-alignment as significant as President Richard Nixon’s opening to China in 1971, and alarm in others, who see Rouhani because the mask behind which the Islamic Republic pursues its unchanged objectives. How should we assess his trip, and the prospects for nuclear and broader diplomacy? Below, I suggest four points that emerge from the past week’s diplomatic drama.

Has Rouhani Checkmated Iran?

First, the notion that Rouhani has ‘checkmated’ Obama – as Fouad Ajami put it  – is untenable. The Obama administration has not just given nothing away, but continues to impose upon Iran the foremost punishing sanctions ever applied to a would-be nuclear proliferator. Iran’s oil exports have more that halved in volume over the last year, inflation is around 60 percent, and over 1 / 4 of Iranian youth are unemployed. The concept Obama is all carrot and no stick is egregiously wrong. On this regard, the chance cost of discussion is negligible.

Is Rouhani All Talk?

Second, some suggest that Rouhani is offering nothing greater than empty words – a ‘smiley campaign’, as Israel’s intelligence minister put it – but no concrete actions. This view is usually mistaken. Rouhani has already freed greater than 80 political prisoners, lots of whom were arrested through the 2009 Green Revolution. The Islamic Republic remains an autocratic regime which holds large numbers of political prisoners and commits grave human rights abuses all the time. However the prisoner release is an indication that Rouhani is willing and ready to at the least partially follow through on pledges he made on his campaign trail.

With respect to the nuclear dispute, Rouhani most crucial action thus far have been to take away the nuclear file from the Supreme National Security Council – that’s more easily influenced by hardliners – and handed it to the more moderate foreign ministry, run by Mohammad Javad Zarif. Western diplomats see Zarif as reasonable and pragmatic, a much cry from previous nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili.

Rouhani couldn’t have changed these arrangements without the approval of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei. Indeed, the Washington Post’s well-connected columnist David Ignatius reported last week that ‘Western intelligence reports’ confirmed Rouhani’s claim to be ‘fully empowered to finalize the nuclear talks’. Obviously, this claim can only be fully tested on the negotiating table.

Yet additionally it is important to recognise that Rouhani’s supposedly empty rhetoric – his praise for Americans, enthusiasm for dialogue, and exhortations to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to remain out of politics – shouldn’t be without domestic political cost. If this round of diplomacy involves nothing, Rouhani should be severely depleted of political capital and Khamenei will happily let him twist within the wind. Words are never enough to strike a deal, but nor should they be discounted too flippantly. They show that Rouhani is willing to anger domestic constituencies in pursuit of his agenda. That may be a positive sign.

Are the usa and Iran Reconciling or Accommodating?

Is Obama Sacrificing Israeli Interests?

RUSI Newsbrief, 24 Jun 2013 By Scott Cline

Defence engagement, a catch-all term for non-operational military activity by which to succeed in influence internationally, is gaining momentum as a core military task for both the U.S. and the united kingdom. The explanation for this is often the will, in an age of fiscal constraint, to derive greater utility from the military: now not can a force simply drill in barracks while awaiting the following conflict. Furthermore, the largest lesson learned in Iraq and Afghanistan is that victory can’t be achieved through brute force alone, with defence engagement increasingly viewed as a prerequisite for understanding all aspects of a conflict. Indeed, by working proactively to deal with the roots of conflict, it’s hoped that this process can obviate the will for costly land campaigns.

To achieve such outcomes, numerous goals for defence engagement has been identified. These include demonstrating commitment to a partner country, establishing enduring relationships with military and political leaders, improving the host country’s ability to address its own internal security, increasing its willingness to take part in friendly coalitions, enhancing mutual understanding, reducing the opportunity of strategic surprise and the likelihood that aggressors miscalculate participating countries’ capabilities, and lengthening responsiveness to crises.

With limited experience to attract upon, whether these goals will be reached is still seen, and could mostly depend upon the extent of investment within the se processes. To this end, in the current fiscal context, the usa and British armies are exploring new ways of executing defence engagement, specifically by using dedicated military units and personnel, and by better aligning military outputs with strategic interests.

To satisfy the increased policy demand for defence engagement, america Army, for instance, has refreshed its Building Partner Capacity doctrine and established Regionally Aligned Forces as section of its force-generation model to support the US’s six Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) – the Africa, Central, European, Southern, Pacific and northerly Commands. Africa Command is the primary GCC to receive a dedicated army brigade, which it can direct in support of its Theater Security Cooperation Plan. Some 140 training events in thirty-four African countries are scheduled in 2013. Future force alignment will involve the alignment of brigades to Europe and the Pacific, of division headquarters to Latin America, North America, Europe and Africa, and of corps headquarters to the Pacific and Middle East. Anticipated activity in 2014 could exceed 5,640 discrete events in 162 countries.

Such engagement is simply not new to america Army. The National Guard’s State Partnership Program (SPP), for instance, has partnered all fifty US states with sixty-five countries in Europe, Africa, Asia and South America to conduct training over the process its twenty-two-year history. Though applauded by the GCCs, the SPP has not been without its problems. A 2012 congressional audit found systemic issues of goals and progress measures. Furthermore, the alignment of activity to strategic objectives needs refreshing: of the $7.1 million spent by the GCCs on SPP activity in 2011, $4.46 million was dedicated to Europe while only $225,000 (3 per cent) was directed to Africa.

In addition, america has no plans to habitually align brigades with specific regions, a measure which might contribute greatly to building relationships and extending understanding. The British Army, then again, is examining this sort of possibility.

Indeed, having laid out its International Defence Engagement Strategy alongside the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review, in 2013-14 the British Army will conduct a pilot project involving the regional alignment of 1 of its existing brigades, the result of that may determine the way other brigades are utilized in the longer term. Such alignments should not as expansive as those of the united states: brigades can be assigned to particular African regions rather than the whole continent, for instance, potentially making an allowance for more targeted activity.

Yet decisions must still be made as to how long personnel should remain with these units to be able to build enduring relationships. And likewise, there’s the difficulty that these brigades will retain responsibility for standing commitments (for instance, in Cyprus), UK resilience and rotations on longstanding operations, potentially diluting their talk about defence engagement.

Furthermore, while Regionally Aligned Forces may allow the u. s. and UK to accomplish probably the most key goals of defence engagement – including building partner capacity, showing commitment to host states and lengthening responsiveness to crises – they’re unlikely to contribute to all of them. It’s because non-persistent activity, despite the fact that conducted regularly, will at best only achieve familiarisation with the objective regions; building lasting relationships would require greater depth.

Here the British Army has essentially the most ground to hide, with america Army making the most of its Foreign Area Officer (FAO) programme. FAOs are selected after eight to 10 years in service (following company command) after which follow the career stream with specific education and management on the topic of their region (for instance, as embassy attachés, in military equipment sales, as regional desk officers, or as provincial reconstruction team leaders) for the rest of their career. Indeed, in 2005, america Department of Defense (DoD), by now aware of the detrimental effect of the shortage of cultural and regional awareness in Iraq and Afghanistan, directed all services to extend FAO numbers and commenced monitoring the effectiveness of the programme in supporting strategic objectives. Since then, the army’s programme has grown from 1,414 to two,046 officers – a forty five per cent increase – with further growth expected, especially within the GCCs. A key to the programme’s success is the delineation of FAOs and other non-command track jobs within separate career streams, with occupants of those positions boarded separately for promotions with DoD guidance that selection rates must be equal to these for command track officers.

Though the British Army offers quite a number FAO-like positions (including the jobs of defence attaché and regional desk officer), recruitment is just not based upon a holistic view of the necessity for specialized officer development over the long run. Indeed, attaché positions are generally filled by those not selected for higher command posts; this must change. In recognition of this, UK planners are exploring new career structures which may offer similar benefits to the united states model. But for the British Army to draw its best officers into this programme, it must provide specialised training and guarantee promotion at comparable rates to basic arms officers.

Beyond this, the likely success of defence engagement is associated with several key enablers. The primary, and predominant, is that its outputs are associated with strategic interests. Indeed, with funding remaining scarce, it’s essential that both the U.S. and UK ruthlessly justify their engagement in certain activities, eliminating that that is now not relevant and expanding that that is most pertinent. Closely tied to it is the will for activities to manifest within an entire-of-government effort. For instance, if the UK’s long-term goal is to contribute to regional security, military training may be but one portion of the method, with targeted DfID aid, Foreign Office engagement with regional security fora, and Stabilisation Unit efforts to extend ministerial capacity likely also required.

Finally, though upstream conflict prevention is more cost effective than protracted combat operations, it’s still not free. Current UK plans acknowledge this, but state that any budget increases for engagement will come from existing MoD funds, thus potentially coming on the cost of contingent capability. A modest increase of £25 million over the following four years have been allocated to UK defence engagement, but is that this enough? Although defence engagement and war-fighting are complementary, they don’t seem to be fungible, with the chance cost of each dollar or pound spent on overseas flights to undertake training being one less round of ammunition at the training range. And because it’s British and American combat capability that makes other nations like to partner with them, trading this for increased defence engagement defeats the point. Clausewitz’s view that ‘the end for which a soldier is recruited, clothed, armed, and trained … is barely that he should fight on the right place and the fitting time’ remains valid, and the united kingdom especially must proceed cautiously given its already low numbers of dedicated combat troops.

As defence engagement matures, the united states and UK (in addition to the ecu) will inevitably find themselves working within the same places. Occasionally this could be unavoidable, because the goal of such engagement could be to acquire concessions from the partner nation, comparable to overflight rights. At other times, however, when the target is solely that of enhancing the partner’s security capacity, training must be rationalised to stop unnecessary duplication, with participating nations dividing their labour in step with comparative advantage and even melding their training teams together.

Although bilateral deconfliction between the united kingdom and US may well be sufficient within the short term, the possible long-term benefits of using NATO as a defence-engagement clearing house also needs to be explored. First, this might allow the united kingdom to exercise leadership within NATO – a stated policy goal. Second, it’s going to keep NATO countries working together post Afghanistan: the NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan has evolved into a good example of firm capacity building and it’d be wasteful to lose this capability. Third, it will probably increase the forces available to undertake defence engagement: with such activity inherently built around small training teams, this may allow nearly every NATO country to take part, despite ever-decreasing force sizes. And eventually, it might optimise the sharing of information across NATO, as a precursor to future operations. NATO remains the popular alliance for the united kingdom and america and the notice gained by all members from defence engagement would only strengthen the Alliance’s utility.

Such optimism, however, has to be moderated and defence engagement ought not be viewed as risk-free. Domestic and regional balances of power are frequently highly unstable and any inputs into such dynamic systems could have unforeseen consequences. The upward push of Japan as an army power between 1859 and the second one World War was an instantaneous results of the learning and kit provided by the united kingdom and France. The alumni folks and British training programmes include such notables as Idi Amin (the despotic former president of Uganda), Amadou Sanogo (leader of the coup in Mali in 2012), and Manuel Noriega (the regional drug lord and previous military governor of Panama, deposed by US troops in 1989). Meanwhile, the upward push of the Taliban is directly associated with the arming of the mujahedeen to accomplish the near-term goal of defeating the Soviet Union in its 1979-89 war in Afghanistan. The history of defence engagement is replete with examples of the so-called ‘law of unintended consequences’.

Such experiences speak to the vital must treat defence engagement not as a brief-fix solution, but as an extended-term process requiring persistence and regularity. Within these parameters, a properly funded and structured army contribution to defence engagement can play a crucial role in shaping and understanding the international environment. The secret’s to prevent pushing the method too far and treating defence engagement as a panacea. While it can help to avoid crises, it’s far, unavoidably, a complementary approach that won’t preclude the necessity to react to contingencies or perform enduring operations when required.
 
Lieutenant Colonel Scott Cline
US Army Strategist (FA59), Exchange Officer to British Army General Staff.

The views expressed listed here are the author’s own and don’t necessarily reflect those of the Ministry of Defence, the dept of Defense or the other institution with which the writer is associated.

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RUSI Defence Systems, 19 Sep 2013 By Avnish Patel

China’s aspirations for global power status and its military modernisation programme, in addition to other regional strategic alliances have given India’s missile defence programme greater credence.  Avnish Patel reviews India’s nuclear capabilities

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RUSI Newsbrief, 24 Jun 2013 By Matthew WillisWhen it involves the viability of a country’s defence policy, there may be nothing unusual about disagreement between the analytical community and the govt.. Seldom, however, are the edges in as thorough disagreement as they’re in Sweden, where a transformation in strategic outlook, an intensive reform programme, a shrinking defence budget and a high operational tempo have all converged. While Defence Minister Karin Enström maintains that Swedish defence is under control, others – in Sweden and beyond – say it’s in meltdown. As is frequently the case, as a matter of fact somewhere in between.

Other countries are watching Sweden closely, especially Finland – its non-aligned neighbour – and the Baltic states, which still look to it for backing in an unpredictable neighbourhood. Britain must be watching too. London has identified the ‘like-minded’ countries of northern Europe as key allies in defence and other areas of policy. Within the broader strategic context of Europe’s dwindling defence capability, it cannot afford to work out a key regional stalwart lose its way.

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The Domestic Deployment of the British Army: The Case for a 3rd Force

Posted on June 19, 2013 at 12:22 pm