RUSI Analysis, 4 Dec 2013

China’s sudden declaration of an Air Defence Identification Zone covering the uninhabited Senkaku islands just isn’t intended to increase Chinese airspace as portion of a place-denial/anti-access strategy. China’s real aim is instead to reinforce their quasi-legal territory claims inside the future.

By Justin Bronk for RUSI.org

The long-running territorial dispute between China and Japan over the uninhabited Senkaku islands (referred to as Diaoyu in China) within the East China Sea recently flared up using China’s sudden declaration of an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) covering the islands and the disputed Chunxiao gas field.

Although this announcement has created a storm of protests from Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and the usa, the imposition of an ADIZ is not at all novel and in reality is a well established tool for formalising claims to national security interests in a region without trying to expand territorial borders. Japan’s own ADIZ covers the Senkaku islands, the Chunxiao gas field and over half the complete East China Sea. South Korea has an ADIZ to the North and the united states has had one in place around Guam for decades.

Therefore, although the Chinese declaration has raised the diplomatic temperature within the region, the announcement of the ADIZ need to be seen within this wider context. The ADIZ have been portrayed in Japan and masses of the Western media as an ineffective attempt at area denial which greatly increases the danger of a miscalculation which may bring about a tremendous crisis. However, Chinese actions up to now suggest that this can be a misleading view and that the ADIZ should instead be seen as an extended term option to strengthen China’s quasi-legal claims to the Senkakus, and test the Obama administration’s willingness to risk a prolonged and dear stand-off over the East China Sea.  

Initial Reactions and the hazards of Accidental Escalation

Since the Chinese ADIZ was announced on 23 November 2013, USAF B-52 bombers, Japanese fighters, surveillance and AWACS aircraft, and South Korean P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft have all deliberately patrolled the zone without complying with the recent requirements to preserve radio contact, submit flight plans, and identify themselves to Chinese air controllers. Furthermore, Japanese airlines have refused to conform with the hot rules unless their destinations are in Chinese territory.

So far, despite Chinese Air Force spokesman Shen Jinke’s statement on 29 November that fighters have been scrambled to observe US and Japanese aircraft within the ADIZ, no actual aerial challenge was reported. The Chinese government has faced domestic criticism for not reacting to the incursions and has reacted by deploying early warning aircraft and jet fighters to patrol the disputed airspace.

This has ended in widespread media speculation in regards to the dangers of a miscalculation by all sides within the air leading to a much wider crisis, especially between China and Japan, which may attract the usa. Certainly, the ADIZ is having the effect of worsening relations in an already tense standoff that has seen multiple incursions by Chinese naval and airborne assets into declared Japanese waters round the Senkakus. However, it is very important consider that unlike other episodes within the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute, which recently saw the Japanese government threaten to shoot down any Chinese unmanned aircraft violating its airspace and China warning that this type of move could be an act of war, the ADIZ has only been accompanied by vague warnings of ‘defensive emergency measures’ for violations. Essentially, Chinese Defence Ministry spokesman Yang Yujun said it was ‘incorrect’ to indicate China would shoot down aircraft which entered the zone without first identifying themselves.

This Chinese declaration means that the dangers of military confrontation within the ADIZ will not be as high as some inside the media have suggested. Whilst the risk of miscalculation is definitely significant, it was already an element within the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute before the Chinese ADIZ was declared and is unlikely to greatly increase for this reason.

What Role Does the ADIZ Play in Chinese strategy whether it is Not Enforced?

The announcement that China is just not threatening to shoot down intruders raises the question of what role China actually assigns to its new ADIZ in national security policy. There isn’t a recognised legal justification for ADIZs however the extent to which they differ from no-fly zones could be seen in legal guidance at the subject that’s issued to the usa Military. Not like Chinese demands, the united states Navy Commander’s Handbook at the Law of Naval Operations states that:

‘The U . s . doesn’t recognize the precise of a coastal nation to use its ADIZ procedures to foreign aircraft not meaning to enter national airspace nor does the us apply its ADIZ procedures to foreign aircraft not desiring to enter U.S. airspace. Accordingly, U.S. military aircraft not aspiring to enter national airspace usually are not identify themselves or otherwise adjust to ADIZ procedures established by other nations, unless the us has specifically agreed to do so’.

It is very probable that the Chinese government views the ADIZ as largely symbolic, in preference to a device to noticeably expand the airspace under China’s direct control. Despite the united states Defense Secretary’s statement that the ADIZ was ‘a destabilizing try to alter the established order inside the region’, China’s actions don’t seem especially unreasonable if one considers that each one its neighbours inside the region have put ADIZs in place to hide territories to which they attach significant national interest.

Viewed on this light, Chinese claims that international protestations over the zone are hypocritical do have a hoop of truth to them. However, it also includes worth noting that the Japanese and US ADIZ’s within the region were announced well earlier than implementation and drawn up as a part of transparent processes. In contrast, China imposed its new ADIZ without prior warning or international consultation. This and the truth that China has demanded aircraft not destined for Chinese territory must comply are factors US criticism has specifically focussed on as Vice-President Joe Biden begins his Asia tour. The Chinese zone is likewise different from other ADIZ’s within the area because it covers territory that’s internationally recognised as being controlled by a foreign power (Japan).

The indisputable fact that up to now China has not taken any meaningful measures to truly enforce compliance with ADIZ requirements means that Japanese and American rhetoric painting it as a kind of area denial over disputed territories is off the mark. The Chinese military is well aware that it cannot expect to enforce the conditions of the ADIZ where it overlaps with the Japanese zone with no full scale military confrontation.

Given the Chinese Government’s sensitivity to national humiliation, it kind of feels odd for China to announce this kind of controversial measure without with the ability to enforce it, if that enforcement was required to complete the aims behind the policy. Needless to say, it’s possible that Beijing simply underestimated the united states and Japanese reaction to the ADIZ and are still debating find out how to respond. However, the shortcoming of enforcement efforts means that China’s aim seriously isn’t simple denial of access to the airspace above the Senkakus and Chunxiao gas field.

Alternate Chinese aims in establishing the ADIZ are inclined to include establishing a protracted-term quasi-legal basis for reinforcing their sovereignty claims to the Senkaku islands. The hope would presumably be that if the opposite regional powers may be able to continue to make use of the airspace without undue hindrance, protests against the ADIZ will slowly die down and in ten years time China can use the brand new ‘lines at the map’ to assert it has a protracted-term legal claim to the realm. The imposition of another framework for military/legal/diplomatic confrontation within the area will also serve to complicate and constrawithin the planning of future Japanese and US manoeuvres in the region.

The ADIZ can also be evidence of a deliberate policy of testing the U.S. commitment to its ‘Pacific pivot’ strategy within the face of continued problems for the Obama administration and American military exhaustion from the Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns. The immediate deployment of B-52s to fly in the course of the new ADIZ represents greater than a signal of refusal to recognize the zone at the portion of the united states.

In this light, it’s a signal to China that the Pentagon and the Obama administration are willing to risk a prolonged, tense and costly stand-off within the East China Sea, and completely comprehend the aptitude geo-strategic implications of China’s increasing assertiveness within the Pacific. It also suggests an apprehension in Washington that if this ADIZ isn’t met with a robust and immediate response, Beijing may repeat the strategy inside the South China Sea and elsewhere as component to its approach to force america and Japan far from the Chinese mainland.

Justin Bronk will also be contacted at j.bronk@hotmail.co.uk

Further Analysis: , , , , ,

RUSI Analysis, 25 Nov 2013 By Shashank Joshi, Research Fellow

The Geneva Agreement is an artistic, astute piece of diplomacy that puts Iran farther from nuclear weapons at within your budget. However the road to a last settlement is long and rocky.

(L to R) British Foreign Secretary William Hague, German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle, EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, US Secretary of State John Kerry,  24 November 2013 (EU photo)

After a decade of on-off nuclear diplomacy and just over one hundred days of the presidency of Iran’s Hassan Rouhani, a deal have been done between Iran and the E3+3 (the united kingdom, France, Germany plus the usa, Russia, and China; in brief, the Six) in Geneva. Although the deal appears to have come rapidly, it’s clear that the groundwork was laid by a US-Iran backchannel going back to at the very least Rouhani’s inauguration in August, and maybe further.

The deal itself is a modest achievement that doesn’t completely freeze Iran’s nuclear programme, defers the various most challenging issues to subsequent diplomacy to occur over the following six months, and depends upon artful language to bridge differences over the most important point of contention, Iran’s claimed ‘right to enrich’ uranium by itself soil. But it surely is an astute and creative piece of diplomacy, putting Iran objectively and verifiably further clear of any nuclear weapon, imposing curbs that transcend those who were anticipated by most observers, and the entire while leaving essentially the mostsome of the most punitive sanctions entirely in place.  

The Geneva Agreement

The deal (whose reported text is on the market here) has about a important aspects worth determining.

All but a freeze

First, it freezes crucial parts of Iran’s nuclear programme, while rolling back those elements which have been doing most to shorten Iran’s breakout time (the time it will take to supply fissile material for a single nuclear weapon).

Enrichment of uranium to twenty per cent, nine-tenths of ways to weapons-grade, is frozen (including by dismantling ‘technical connections’ between cascades) and stockpiles of uranium enriched to that higher level are to be converted into reactor fuel or diluted to lower levels.

Iran will continue enrichment as much as 5 per cent, but, importantly, has agreed that its stockpile of this lower enriched uranium can not grow over the six month period of the deal: it is going to convert the excess into oxide form, which makes it less readily usable for weapons use. Iran would possibly not install additional centrifuges, must leave a big proportion of installed centrifuges inactive, and can not even manufacture new centrifuges rather then to interchange damaged ones. That is  something it’s to be verified through ‘IAEA access to centrifuge assembly facilities’ and ‘centrifuge rotor component production and storage facilities’, measures that go way past Iran’s formal obligations to the Agency.

Iran’s heavy water reactor at Arak was never going to head operational in the course of the period of this interim deal anyway, however the agreement forbids Iran from transferring fuel or heavy water to the location – from testing or producing fuel, or installing ‘remaining components’ – easing the understandable concerns over how Iran may have used the deal to make progress towards activation of the reactor.

The implications of this are threefold: first, Iran’s breakout time has nearly doubled (from ‘no less than 1-1.6 months to at least 1.9-2.2 months’, consistent with ISIS’ David Albright); second, even the deal’s collapse will leave the West in a closer position than the pre-deal established order; third, the deal guards against Iran ‘buying time’ for 6 months after which, on the end of the negotiating period, installing enrichment capacity that it had built up and held in reserve. This increase in breakout time is very important, and it will be interpreted along side further provisions for ‘enhanced monitoring’ of Iran’s programme and daily access for inspectors (more than today). These upgraded monitoring rights are only a start – as portion of a last deal, Iran must ratify an extra Protocol, which supplies the IAEA wider powers – nonetheless it is a vital element, and one who, as Jeffrey Lewis explains, also modestly decreases the chance that Iran could conceal any secret nuclear facilities besides its declared, safeguarded ones.

In sum: not just wouldn’t it take Iran longer to provide the fissile material for a nuclear weapon, but its likelihood of having caught has also increased. The potential for undetected or unstoppable breakout has therefore diminished greatly. Counting on how the IAEA employed its new powers, the united states and Israel would have around two months after detecting any Iranian attempt at breakout to reply, greater than sufficient time for whatever response they deemed appropriate, including an army one (obviously, for those that believe that the united states would never use force against Iran, breakout times are irrelevant). Had a deal not been done, Iran’s breakout time would have shrunk over this same period to three weeks, long before sanctions compelled it to dismantle its programme.

Sanctions Relief

Second, the deal comes cheaply. Iran is being granted not up to $7 billion of sanctions relief interested by releasing frozen Iranian funds and relief on gold, petrochemical, and automobile sector sanctions. It is a small fraction of the fee being imposed monthly by the punishing oil and banking sanctions that stay firmly in place, including all EU-mandated sanctions. The deal also permits ‘Iran’s current customers to buy their current average amounts of crude oil’, which removes the specter of further export cuts and protects Iranian revenue. But Iran will still be forfeiting over thrice as much in foregone oil revenue because it will gain in relief.

There isn’t any logical explanation why these measures should subsequently weaken the remainder sanctions over the years, since the costs of noncompliance remain as high as ever. There isn’t any sanctions slippery slope. Moreover, if Iran is unwilling to comply with the further curbs and transparency measures of a last deal, new sanctions could greater than offset any gain it made within the six-month interim period.  

Compromise on enrichment

Third, the agreement is phenomenally carefully balanced at the issue of whether Iran is to be granted a ‘right to enrich’, something that Iranian officials had made a deal-breaker. US Secretary of State John Kerry insisted after the deal that ‘we don’t recognise a right to enrich’, whereas his Iranian counterpart, Mohammad Javad Zarif, declared the alternative.  This disagreement is a function of the language employed within the text:

This comprehensive solution would involve a mutually defined enrichment program with practical limits and transparency measures to make certain the peaceful nature of this system. This comprehensive solution would constitute an integrated whole where nothing is agreed until everything is agreed.

Various UN Security Council resolutions have called on Iran to halt enrichment activity, and plenty of have taken the view that Iran should therefore only be granted sanctions relief upon perfect compliance – the so-called ‘zero enrichment’ position. P5+1 officials recognised that this was unrealistic, given the domestic prominence of the difficulty within Iran, but they were wary of agreeing that Iran had what it called an ‘inalienable’ right to enrichment, not least because this can set troubling precedents for civil nuclear cooperation and other cases of potential nuclear proliferation.

The language during this agreement is an intelligent compromise. America can argue that a ‘mutually defined’ programme is one who exists by consent, not by right, and that no such precedent is being sent; Iran can argue that any form of enrichment activity presupposes a right to enrichment, and that its right have been implicit recognised.

Moreover, the usa can claim that Iranian enrichment is just sanctioned under heavy curbs – without which the ‘integrated whole’ is incomplete and no enrichment programme could be ‘defined’ i.e., granted. Iran nonetheless will point to the clause specifying that ‘following successful implementation of the ultimate step of the great solution for its full duration, the Iranian nuclear program can be treated within the same manner as that of any non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT’, suggesting that each one limits on enrichment capacity and suchlike will disappear if and when Iran can demonstrate its alleged nuclear weapons work not continues. Here is prone to become some extent of greater contention in final status discussion.

Loopholes

It is understandable that every side will interpret the agreement to fit its own interests, particularly when the problem has domestic political resonance. It was crucial for Iran’s negotiating team that they had been seen to successfully defend Iran’s nuclear rights, not least since the Supreme Leader had emphasised this issue. But this matter can become a source of anxiety if each side is seen to be exploiting loopholes.

When america concluded a handle North Korea last year, it assumed that missile tests were banned. But Pyongyang then conducted a satellite launch, which amounts to an identical thing; even though it were verbally agreed that this will be forbidden, it was never formalised. The diplomacy in Geneva was protracted and painstaking precisely to tie such loopholes up, but in an agreement of such complexity, handling highly complex nuclear issues, more points of friction may emerge through the years. Critics will soon complain that Iran’s missile programme, which was bound up with its alleged pre-2003 weapons programme, has gone unaddressed.

The agreement does specify that ‘a Joint Commission of E3/EU+3 [the Six powers] and Iran may be established to observe the implementation of the near-term measures and address issues that will arise’, however the key test of this commission could be its ability to solve any disputes before they rise, as they might quickly, to the political level. It will become more important than ever that the international community holds Iran to those commitments, on pain of further sanctions, but in addition that the united states upholds its own promises, particularly those concerning its own pause inside the imposition of recent sanctions.

Final status

Posted in Security Systems