RUSI Analysis, 9 Jul 2013 By Raffaello Pantucci, Senior Research Fellow

Abu Qatada symbolised an era of British jihadism that trusted radical preachers to motivate a generation of terrorists. Alongside a general degradation of Al-Qa’ida’s capacity to launch large-scale plots, Qatada’s departure marks an end of an era that peaked in the course of the 7 July 2005 attacks on London.

The departure of Abu Qatada from British soil at the eighth anniversary of the 7 July bombings in London marks something of a marker for a period of British jihadism. From a coordinated threat directed by Al-Qa’ida that drew on a community of young British Muslims fostered by radical preachers resulting in plots just like the 7/7 attack, the menace has now evolved. Expressions inside the kind of attempted attacks or thwarted plots continue to look, but gone is both the straightforward and public coordination at home epitomised by the unconventional preacher community within the UK, and gone is ability of Al-Qaida core in Waziristan especially to govern large scale plots through this actual network to strike on British soil.

Radical Preachers

Abu Qatada was the last of 4 prominent preachers within the Uk around whom young radicals from all over the world gathered and who formed the nub of what was publicly derided as ‘Londonistan.’ A period within the 1990s when Britain became the house faraway from home for plenty of preachers and activists from around the Muslim world agitating for change, both violent and non-violent, of their home countries. A lot of these individuals presented (and continue to provide) no specific threat to the united kingdom, and are focused a great deal on events abroad.

Abu Qatada’s role within this community was a captivating one. Largely focused abroad, he nevertheless had authority over this sub-community within the UK. Particularly, he was reported to have told security services that he could ‘wield powerful, spiritual influence over the Algerian community in London.’ He also acted as a teacher figure to younger men Abu Hamza and Abdullah el-Faisal, either one of whom were characterised as his students at one time or another. He seems to have had a less direct relationship with Omar Bakri Mohammed, the fourth of the novel preachers, though it sort of feels clear the boys moved in similar circles in London. Abu Qatada’s credentials as a scholar and his links to 1 the fathers of contemporary Salafism, Muhammad Nasiruddin al-Albani set him aside from the opposite three who lacked such credentials. Unlike the opposite three, his impact seems to were more ideological, while the others fostered networks and communities from which a lot of terrorist plots emerged.

Al Qa’ida Orchestration

The most successful of those plots was 7/7 bombings finished by four men, a minimum of two of whom were trained by Al-Qa’ida in Waziristan. This plot, like lots of others that were disrupted before and because, involved Britons who have been radicalised partially under the tutelage of the unconventional preacher community, managed to determine connections with Al Qa’ida core and were directed to hold out attacks inside the West. Numerous other plots were disrupted from this network, including the August 2006 plot codenamed ‘Overt’ that aimed to bring down somewhere inside the region of eight flights on transatlantic routes with a possible casualty count higher than the 11 September 2001 attacks.

These plots drew their footsoldiers from the unconventional communities that the united kingdom-based preachers fostered. Recruiters for Al-Qa’ida or other extremists used this space  to search out funding and followers. Going abroad, all these men were initially trying to fight and die on foreign battlefields. However, once there, some were re-directed back to conduct attacks at home as Al-Qa’ida realised their potential as a community that may penetrate deep into Western society. Key individuals like British national Rashid Rauf became the connective tissue providing a link between the senior echelons of Al-Qa’ida and the British recruits, helping them get around Waziristan after which providing managerial control over operations.

Over time, however, this connection has come under increasing scrutiny as  Western intelligence services realised its magnitude and increasingly became ready to intercept its communications, penetrate its structures and take away key players from the sector. This ended in a gentle degradation of the network, though there’s evidence that the community of people wanting to travel to and fro to hunt training continues to exist.

Most recently this connection was seen in a case in Birmingham wherein multiple Britons travelled to Pakistan’s lawless provinces, trained alongside groups on the point of Al-Qa’ida before receiving loose direction to come home to hold out an incident of a few sort. It is a world aside from the Operation Overt cell from 2006 where multiple elements were in repeated contact with masterminds back in Pakistan who had provided specific training and targeting and helped them along the trajectory of the plot. By 2011, the extent of orchestration from afar was much harder to spot with Irfan Naseer – the plot leader of the Birmingham cell – giving little indication of being in regular touch with someone abroad. In a comment overheard by a safety listening device he said that his guidance was more rudimentary than that: ‘they said yeah, the information they gave us, they need that to spread to Europe.’ There has been little evidence offered in the course of the case (or any of the alternative cases associated with the core cell around IrfanNaseer) that anything was being orchestrated from afar. As was commented on the time, the approach appeared to be ‘fire and forget.’

Threat Shifting Overseas

But as groups in Pakistan particularly come under increasing pressure and lose their reach back to the united kingdom, the threat elsewhere abroad have been growing, and the prospective remains for foreign networks to apply the continued flow of British fighters to places like Syria to launch attacks back home. Currently, groups leading the fight in Syria have demonstrated no real interest in launching a terrorist attack within the UK (or anywhere else specifically for that matter – their interest seems involved in toppling Bashar al Assad’s regime), however it is an open question how it will develop at some point.

Beyond foreign battlefields, the net has helped spread radical ideas and made them more accessible. Lone actor terrorism is a singular phenomenon that has shown a capability to precise itself in a random and violent manner. And actions by extremist Islamist groups in Europe have ended in a counter-reaction by extremists at the other end of the spectrum. Now we have evolved, though not entirely passed, from a time when people sought out the community of radical preachers reminiscent of Abu Qatada, and from them were recruited by groups to head and fight abroad.

This evolution has turn up for several reasons. Primary amongst these was the removal of the unconventional preachers (Abu Hamza through jail after which deportation to the usa, Abdulla el Faisal through jail after which deportation to Jamaica, and Omar Bakri Mohammed through a self-imposed exile) and the removal of the open space within which they can operate. Abu Qatada’s departure from Britain for Jordan’s courts marks the realization of a protracted process by successive British governments that sought to expel these figures from the united kingdom. New charismatic leaders and preachers have since emerged, but current legislation signifies that they’re much more circumspect of their comments and openness in actively pushing people to head and fight abroad. Everyone is still drawing ideas from this ideological pool and a few are electing to head and fight abroad, however the direct linkages are actually much more discreet.

The other side to this coin is located in Pakistan where Al-Qa’ida’s ability to direct plots and plotters was substantially degraded. The pressure of drone strikes and a growing western intelligence footprint signifies that key figures like Rauf and diverse other Al-Qa’ida figures had been taken off the battlefield. People that are left are having to supply guidance and coaching in way more constrained environment, and once people have left the camps they’re largely being left to easily get on with trying to perform attacks. The age of enormous-scale orchestrated plots from Pakistan seems to have passed.

Additionally, the emergence of Al-Qa’ida affiliates and battlefields of competing interest has given individuals lots of different locations where they are able to seek to locate the journey and thrill of jihad or play their role in fighting to guard the ‘ummah.’ How these different battlefields will impact the threat picture within the UK is a developing story, but for the time being they don’t pose the identical variety of threat that Al-Qa’ida’s grand plans directed from Pakistan did.

Coming exactly eight years after Al-Qa’ida’s last successful attack at the west, Abu Qatada’s deportation marks the top of an era in British counter-terrorism. But as one era seems to return to an in depth, a brand new one could be being forged on foreign battlefields and the net marking an evolution of an issue many inside the UK may consider removed with Abu Qatada’s departure.

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