RUSI Analysis, 18 Feb 2014

Stoking sectarianism, threatening stability and interfering in sovereign countries: Iran already is a source of instability to Gulf countries even with no deal on its nuclear programme. Feeling vulnerable, Gulf countries may look to US alternatives to ensure their security.

By Omar Mahmood for RUSI.org

This article is a part of RUSI’s ongoing series charting regional responses to Iran’s Nuclear Diplomacy.

Bahrain – These are crucial times for the Gulf region. The present nuclear deal between Iran and the West have been viewed with much pessimism during the world or even more so amongst the Arab Gulf states. What must be understood from the Gulf states perspective regarding Iran’s nuclear ambitions isn’t the fear of Iran ever using a nuclear bomb but of the ability holding any such weapon brings.

A key issue that’s not given much attention in all of the talks a couple of nuclear Iran are the non-nuclear abilities Iran is currently building, which might likely increase tenfold if Iran ever went nuclear. The best threat to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is Iran’s asymmetric capabilities. The reaction of the Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia isn’t one out of vexation but of genuine concern regarding these capabilities.

Iran is currently within the means of developing precision guided missiles, that are more of a genuine world threat then nuclear weapons would ever be. Their asymmetric naval capabilities are a true threat to the shipping lanes or even against much bigger (and slower) US ships. Iran currently has thousands of sea mines in its possession, and likewise possesses an array of short and long range anti-ship missiles.

Another fear of a nuclear Iran is the expansionist policies Iran would be at liberty to pursue due a scarcity of a major threat against it if it ever went nuclear. Iran would further heavily put money into Lebanon, Syria and Iraq, further bringing these states into its orbit, that is seen with real fear in Riyadh. A question that has also been neglected is the expansion of sectarian tensions inside the region which might take place through Iran’s increased political clout if it were to have a weaponised nuclear programme. Iran’s interference inside the Gulf states would doubtless increase, which might probably also cause more of a rift between the several sects and their relations with the governments of the Gulf States.

The Gulf states, excluding Saudi Arabia, all lack strategic depth, that is also among the many many reasons each Gulf states’ policy towards Iran differ. As mentioned inside the paper, for now, the Gulf states haven’t any choice but to depend upon america as a safety guarantor and partner. Gulf militaries have heavily invested in US military technology and weaponry, and it’d require decades and billions of bucks to buy new weapons and systems from countries similar to China or Russia for instance.

No doubt the Gulf States face a conundrum, States along with Saudi Arabia currently wouldn’t have the facility to directly affect any nuclear deal made with Iran. For now the single viable options the Gulf States have are diplomatic and political. While Saudi Arabia and the UAE are pursuing civilian nuclear programmes, many doubt they might expand this into the area of nuclear weapons. Saudi Arabia would face intense international pressure and threats of sanctions if it were to move ahead with its threats.

This leaves the Gulf states with a couple of options; the primary could be to expand diplomatic, political and economic ties with countries together with India and China (which they’ve been). Both China and India have close relations with Iran and the Gulf states could use this to their advantage.

Second, the Gulf states should get their very own houses so as, to house a potentially nuclear Iran. This will likely require sacrifices, and following through on years of exceptional intra-Gulf deals and agreements that have yet to be implemented and putting aside their personal quarrels. Increasing Gulf military and defence cooperation is very important, coordinating weapons purchases, military exercises, and finding lasting solutions to the political issues that affect lots of the GCC states. This can require patience and won’t be achieved over night.

A few of the GCC leaders recently met privately to minimize any perceived tensions between them and strengthen ties. Certainly, there’s a sense of newfound hope in regards to the new Emir of Qatar who’s believed to be less intrusive and more consistent with the remainder of the GCC. Oman has always been different in its policies and traditions; the largest threat Oman believes itself to stand is a good stronger and bullish Saudi Arabia, for you to force its own objectives at the remainder of the GCC states. Many inside the Omani government believe that forming a Gulf Union currently isn’t realistic, observing the undeniable fact that such a lot of GCC initiatives haven’t begun to bear fruit. Saudi Arabia and the GCC states have to address these concerns and start the implementation of earlier initiatives.

The US should take these concerns seriously and understand why lots of the regions states have publicly questioned the present nuclear focus on Iran and examine america commitment to the region, especially the Gulf, with suspicion. The united states has spoken lots about its ongoing commitment to the region, but perhaps it must put words into actions. While the choices of the Gulf states are limited in regards to the nuclear deal, america should note that the Gulf states aren’t minor players within the region. The GCC is among the biggest buyers folks weaponry, and it holds significant influence amongst other nations inside the region, which it may use to undermine or disrupt US policies and objectives if ties were to ever sour further. The GCC will always be a big player within the Middle East and an easier alternative to the Arab League.

To the GCC states, an Iran another time integrated into the international order, won’t change its asymmetric behaviour, throughout the various means it employs within the region. Finally, a couple of questions have to be asked; if the deal is successful, what does it mean for the long run security architecture of the region? What role will the united states play in integrating Iran into this new architecture? How will civil war in Syria and internal conflict in Yemen and Iraq play out inside the relations between the Gulf and Iran, whether Iran’s nuclear programme becomes weaponised or not?

Omar Mohamed is currently a Research Analyst at DERASAT Bahrain, with a level in Peace and Conflict Studies with Economics.

Further Analysis: , , , ,